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Commentary
JUDGING JUDGING
WILLIAM POWERS, JR.

I am especially pleased to have been asked to comment on Judge Linde's
1993 Monsanto Lecture. At a time when members of the academy and bench
sometimes wonder whether they are like ships passing in the night,' Professor
n6 Judge nd Professor Linde's life belies the supposed gap between theory and
practice. At a time when, regrettably, public interest in judging focused almost
exclusively on federal judges and questions of public law, Judge Linde gained
prominence as the preeminent common law judge of his generation. He did so
with wit, style, and grace, and, more to the point of his remarks here, he did
so with a restrained (though not ineffectual) view about the role of judges.
When Judge Linde speaks about judging, people listen.
I come openly to praise Judge Linde's remarks. Though his style is easy,
the question he poses and the answer he gives are at the heart of a theory of
judging and, consequently, of law. He makes three basic points: (1) judging
is different from other normative activities, particularly legislating, (2) this
difference is (or should be) maintained by the kinds of reasons judges give for
their decisions, and (3) specifically, judges who rest their decisions on
considerations of public policy should rely on public expressions of policy, not
on their own lights. Each point is important, each point is unfashionable, and,
in my opinion, each point is correct.
One of the legacies of legal realism, and one of the tenets of some current
critical theory, is that whatever judges say they are doing, they are really doing
something else. When they say they are deferring to an external standard they
are really just imposing their own values. When they say they are deferring to
a statute or precedent, they are really just deciding how our social world ought
to be structured. When they say they are being subordinate to the legislature,
. Hines H. Baker and Thelma Kelley Baker Chair in Law, The University of Texas School of
Law.
1. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards' Indictment of
"Impractical"Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars,91 MICH. L. REv. 2010 (1993); Harry
T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A
Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993).
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they are really just legislating. 2 This conclusion is often supported by a claim
that law is indeterminate, and therefore does not really constrain a judge, so the
judge must really be doing something else. Why this "something else" must be
legislating, as opposed to acting on a whim or following the command of God,
is often unclear, but legislating is the usual suspect.'
The objection that judging is not really different from legislating runs
counter to our shared legal experience. For example, in Melody Home
Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes,4 the Texas Supreme Court held that a contract
to repair tangible goods has an implied warranty of good and workmanlike
service that is enforceable under Texas's Deceptive Trade Practices Act.' Two
years earlier, in Dennis v. Allen,6 the Court had decided that professional
services do not have an implied warranty of good and workmanlike service and
therefore are not covered by the Act. In a concurring opinion, Justice Gonzalez
wondered what had happened in the interim.7 Justice Mauzy responded:
Both the Senate sponsor and the House sponsor of House Bill 417
wanted to include breach of implied warranties in the bill when it was
being considered by the legislature in 1973. However, the Attorney
General of Texas had entered into a political agreement not to include
implied warranties in an effort to have a "consensus" bill. I was the
Senate sponsor of H.B. 417 and I am well aware of the compromises
and political horse trading engaged in by the Attorney General of
Texas at the time the bill was passed. I fail to see how those political
compromises that were so necessary to achieve a worthwhile result in
the legislative process 14 years ago can in any way be construed as
"an improper excursion into the legislative arena" [as Justice Gonzalez
had argued].
The concurring opinion asks how this case is any different from

2. Even H.L.A. Hart, who thought judges are sometimes constrained, believed that when they
are not constrained (i.e., when they decide cases in the "penumbra" rather than the "core") they act
as legislators. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism].
3. Opponents of the idea that judging is different from other normative disciplines, that is, that
it is at least partially an "autonomous" normative activity, propose competing theories of what this
'something else" really is, from economics to politics to social science. See, e.g., WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (economics);
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (politics). It is difficult to
understand how judging can be all of these things at once, unless these other activities are also really
one and the same.
4. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
5. Id. at 351; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1993).
6. 698 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. 1985).
7. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 358 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
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The answer to that question is that the
Dennis v. Allison ....
makeup of this court has changed.... The people, speaking through
the elective process, have constituted a new majority of this court. . .. '
It seems clear to me, at least, that Justice Mauzy confused his earlier role
as a legislator with his new role as a judge. Melody Home was a celebrated case
in Texas, and I have not spoken with anyone-regardless of their views about
the desirability of imposing warranties in service transactions, regardless of their
views about the appropriate reading of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
regardless of their views about the legitimacy of judges "making policy"-who
thinks Justice Mauzy decided the case in a way that is appropriate for a judge.
It seems, after all, that judges and legislators do have different roles, as Judge
Linde insists. We are sometimes confused about this distinction when we study
hard cases. In hard cases we argue about the fine points of a judge's role and
are impressed with the difficulty of drawing precise lines to define it. In easy
cases, 9 however, such as Justice Mauzy's opinion in Melody Home, it is
difficult to deny the difference between the role of a judge and the role of a
legislator.
A conclusion that Justice Mauzy confused his role as a judge with his
earlier role as a legislator does not depend on a conclusion that he was wrong
about the merits of his argument or that his motivations were bad. His
motivations, as distinguished from his reasons, are beside the point. ° In any
event, Justice Mauzy is a decent, compassionate, "well-motivated" person. It
is not that he based his decision on an intrinsically pernicious or fallacious
argument. If he had in fact been a legislator, a change in the composition of the
legislature would have been a perfectly appropriate argument. His argument
was not wrong, it was just inappropriate for a judge. "
Judge Linde's second point is that we should evaluate the legitimacy of a
judge's decision by the reasons he gives, not by the result he reaches. This
claim, too, swims against the current. An implicit feature of much current legal
scholarship is that we should organize legal rules, doctrines, and holdings (that
is, results of legal reasoning) according to some preferred normative theory,
such as economics," Aristotelian justice, 3 civic republicanism, 4 liberal-

8. Id. at 361-62.
9. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19.
11. Similarly, a legislature might provide relief to the victims of an earthquake or a flood on
the grounds of charity and human solidarity, but these would not be appropriate reasons for a court
to order such relief. The issue is not the intrinsic merits of the arguments, it is the propriety of the
arguments as bases of judicial decisions. Again, it is these easy cases that support Judge Linde's
claim that the role of a judge is different from the role of a legislator.
12. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 3.
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ism, 5 and so on. We can always evaluate the content of law from the
perspective of another normative system, but this style of scholarship does more
(or less) than that. It offers these other systems asfoundations for law. On this
view, these other disciplines are, in an important sense, part of law. 6 They
purport to support the "surface" phenomena of doctrines, rules, and holdings
from a "deeper" foundation that is internal to the legal system.
Important, and to my mind pernicious, features of this approach are (1) that
it fails to maintain an appropriate distinction between law and other disciplines,
and (2) that it encourages a fetish for evaluating the results rather than the
methods of legal analysis. The first problem is that addressed by legal
positivism, and while Judge Linde's claim is consistent with (indeed even
supportive of) legal positivism, the separation of law from other disciplines is
not the central goal of his remarks. The second problem, however, is at the
heart of Judge Linde's remarks.
Judge Linde insists that the legitimacy of a judge's decision should be
determined by the reasons the judge uses, not the results the judge reaches. 7
Thus, we can say that Justice Mauzy wrote an illegitimate opinion, irrespective
of the rule, doctrine, or holding that it established. Imposing an implied
warranty of good and workmanlike service in transactions to repair tangible
goods is not what makes his opinion illegitimate (or what could make his opinion
legitimate). The reasons he gave to reach that result are what make his opinion
illegitimate.' From this perspective, the majority opinion in Melody Home,
which also reached the result of adopting an implied warranty of good and
workmanlike service to repair tangible goods, might be legitimate, even if
Justice Mauzy's opinion is not. The difference would be in the kinds of reasons
each opinion used to explain its conclusions.
We might think that this view of legitimacy is problematic on either or both
of two grounds. First, using an account of legitimacy that refers to the types of
reasons ajudge gives, rather than the result the judge reaches, raises the specter

13. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992).
14. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REv.
211 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Liberal Constitutionalism and Liberal Justice, 72 TEx. L. REV.
305 (1993).
16. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
17. See PHILIP BOBBIrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982)
(describing six modes of constitutional analysis that legitimate judicial review); PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION

(1991)

(same)

[hereinafter

BOBBITT,

CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION].

18. If we insist on evaluating the results in these terms, we should just ask whether a judge
reached a result by using legitimate reasons.
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of indeterminacy. Indeterminacy also has other sources-such as conflicting
lines of precedent, ambiguous language in statutes, and so on-but a criterion
that does not even try to evaluate results openly admits that identifying
determinate results is not even a goal.
A criterion that focuses on reasons might require determinate results as a
by-product if it is sufficiently narrow to require only one set of reasons for each
case and these reasons dictate a unique result. Any plausible criterion of
legitimate reasons, however, is likely to approve a variety of reasons, indeed a
variety of types of reasons. For example, would we not approve reasons that
refer to a statute's language and reasons that refer to a statute's purpose as both
being permissible types of reasons for a judge to give? And is it not possible
that these different types of reasons might lead a judge to different results? If
so, evaluating the legitimacy of judicial opinions by the types of reasons they
employ rather than by the results they reach recognizes yet a new source of
indeterminacy.
There is no answer to this objection other than to say, "So what?" For
those who strive for determinacy, an evaluation of a judicial opinion's legitimacy
in terms of the reasons it employs surely is not attractive. But why should we
insist that our legal system is determinate in the strong sense that the objection
requires? Is our legal experience not just the opposite, that our system does not
dictate determinate results in all cases? And are we not likely to be in a better
position to police or evaluate the kinds of reasons judges use than to police or
evaluate results according to a controversial normative criterion? If so, why shy
away from applying criteria about good judging to the reasons judges use and
openly recognize (even embrace) the fact that judges must make choices among
reasons, that is, that judges must decide cases?' 9 There is not the time or
space here to argue for these conclusions in any detail. I can, however, at least
suggest that the objection from indeterminacy is not self-evidently correct.
Second, a criterion of judging that focuses on the types of reasons a judge
employs, rather than the results a judge reaches, runs counter to the fashion of
scientism in legal theory. Unlike normative systems, science thrives on giving

19. See BOBBIrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17.
Indeterminacy does not mean that we are always adrift when trying to predict what a judge
will do. Constraining the kinds of reasons a judge can use, coupled with knowledge about judicial
practice, permits a great deal of predictability, notwithstanding that judges sometimes consciously
choose between different types of legitimate reasons that point to opposite results. Judges do have
irreducible choice in many cases, but we can still predict what judges will do in most cases. It is
no answer to say that we cannot do so in hard cases or that easy cases are not "interesting." The
social value of predictability comes from legal practice in run-of-the-mill, easy cases. Moreover,
predictability is only one of the values a legal system serves. Another value is having a widely
accepted method for resolving disputes.
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a unique account of events, and it judges success by being able to predict the
future. Causation is the central feature of the scientific approach. If a theory
cannot provide an account of what caused an event, it has not done its job. A
"scientific" approach to the social sciences applies the same criteria to social
events. Applied to law, scientism seeks to explain why, not just how, judges
reach results in specific cases. It seeks to offer an algorithm to predict results.
It seeks to provide an account of what caused results in the past. Thus, it
abhors an open recognition of choice, indeterminacy, and decision. A criterion
of judging that focuses on a judge's reasons, rather than on the judge's results,
accomplishes none of these goals.
My answer to this second objection is similar to my answer to the first
objection. The problem is not with a criterion that focuses on reasons, it is with
scientism itself. Insisting on a causative account (in the scientific sense) of
normative decisions is itself a mistake. It is as though we evaluated a
mathematical argument by insisting on a causative account of what made the
mathematician choose a particular mathematical tool. Why a mathematician (or
judge) chose a particular tool might itself be an interesting question of
psychology, but this does not mean that mathematics (or jurisprudence) itself
must give such an account. History, sociology, and psychology ask interesting
questions about law, but they do not provide the appropriate internal account of
judging. A jurisprudential theory of appropriate judging simply should not
strive for a scientific account.
Again, these remarks do not fully answer the objection from scientism.
Proponents of scientism in legal theory would undoubtedly have much to say in
response.
The point here is again that scientism is not self-evidently
unobjectionable as an approach to jurisprudence. At least a plausible (and to my
mind correct) response to the objection from scientism is simply to reject the
premises of scientism in jurisprudence at the outset of the debate. That is, the
goal of a jurisprudential theory is decidedly not to give a scientific account of
judicial decisions. Thus, it is no embarrassment to a jurisprudential position
that, because it focuses on reasons rather than results, it does not give an
account of what caused a uniquely determined result.'
Judge Linde's third point is more specific than his first two. Here he
argues not only that judicial opinions should be judged by the reasons a judge
employs, but also that certain types of reasons are (or should be) impermissible.

20. Itmight also be argued that this view obscures the important question of whether the result
is morally justifiable (or correct on some other, external normative standard). This is just the
general issue of legal positivism. I cannot answer the issue here, other than to say that the view
does no such thing. Indeed, it highlights the issue of moral (or other) justifiability, which is an
important and distinct issue.
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In addition, he argues that while some types of reasons are permissible tools for
judges to employ, others are not. Specifically, he argues that, when judges refer
to "policy" reasons, they should consult "public" embodiments of the policy,
not their own lights. It would not be permissible, under Judge Linde's view, for
a judge to abandon punitive damages in medical malpractice cases simply
because the judge thinks that we face a crisis of defensive medicine. It would
be permissible, however, for a judge to rely on this policy argument if, for
example, the legislature had shortened the statute of limitations in medical
malpractice cases in response to such a crisis. The statute itself would not
resolve the issue of punitive damages, but it would be "public" evidence of a
policy to reduce defensive medicine that a judge could use to explain a decision
to abandon punitive damages. Judge Linde observes that our current legal
practice does not limit judges in their reference to "public" instantiations of a
policy, but he argues that judges should limit their practice in this way.
Judge Linde's third point raises two issues: what counts as a public reason,
and why should we limit judges to public reasons? First, what counts as a
public reason? Judge Linde would include any legislative statement of policy,
even if it comes in the form of a statute that does not specifically address the
problem the judge faces in a particular case. We probably would want to
include implicit evidence of a legislative policy by allowing judges to infer
We might also include
policies from statutory structures and schemes.
embodiments of policy reflected in the statements and actions of other political
actors, such as executive branch officers and administrative officials. We would
also surely include policies reflected in judicial precedents.
But what about evidence of "social" policies that are reflected in the
statements and actions of private individuals and institutions? Should the fact
that churches and other private institutions widely support aid to the homeless
count as evidence of a public policy? Should a long line of academic
commentary in favor of a policy count as public evidence of that policy? What
of a single law review article? And how specific must the public policy be?
Does our general commitment to privacy count as a reason to protect medical
records against disclosure, or must a judge find public evidence of a policy in
favor of privacy with regard to medical records?
As with most problems, there will be close cases and difficult lines to draw.
But what should be our motivating concerns? This depends on the second issue
raised by Judge Linde's third point: why should we even insist on public
evidence of policies in judicial opinions? It is helpful here to invoke a similar
proposal by John Rawls in the realm of political discourse.
In his new book, PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls argues that political debate
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should be limited to reasons that are, in his sense of the word, public. 21 By
this he means that, in a pluralistic society-where citizens have different views
about morals, religion, and social goals-political debate should be limited to
reasons that reflect our overlapping consensus in favor of social and political
cooperation. A commitment to tolerance is part of this overlapping consensus,
so reliance on the value of tolerance is permissible in public political debate.
A commitment to Christianity or feminism is not part of this consensus, so
reference to these values is not permissible in public, political debate.
Rawls's view of public reasons in politicaldebate is problematic for several
reasons, ' but these reasons need not concern us here. The point here is
Rawls's argument for insisting on public reasons in political debate. Political
debate, he argues, should be structured to support our underlying commitment
to social and political cooperation among pluralistic groups that otherwise differ
about basic religious and moral values. It is not reasonable to expect any group
to cede to another group the criteria to resolve moral and religious issues, and
if each group argues from its own particular commitments, public discourse will
break down. Only by limiting public debate to reasons that are part of the
overlapping consensus for social and political cooperation can we support and
strengthen the overlapping consensus that permits social cooperation in the first
place. Permitting individuals to argue from within their own moral and religious
convictions would undermine faith in and support of our commitment to social
and political cooperation among pluralistic groups.
Rawls may not be convincing in his specific claim about political
discourse,' but his general point is instructive. The reasons used in a
particular type of discourse should support the goals and needs of the discourse
itself. For Rawls, this means that public political discourse should use reasons
that can reinforce the stability of public political discourse in a pluralistic
society. What, then, is Judge Linde's reason for limiting use of policy reasons
to public embodiments of policy?
One reason might be democracy. Policy disputes, so this argument goes,
should be resolved by the political branches of government, at least whenever
possible. If this is the reason for insisting on public evidence of policies, we
should look for the statements and acts of public officials who are elected to
make policy or are appointed by elected officials to make these decisions.
Under this view, law review articles and statements or activities of private
institutions and actors, such as churches, unions, and civic organizations, should

21. JOHN RAWLS, POUTICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1991).

22. 1 have addressed these problems elsewhere. See William Powers, Jr., Constructing Liberal
Political Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 443 (1993).
23. Id.
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not count.
There might be another reason, however, why public evidence of policies
is important for judicial discourse. Maybe we want judges to refer to public
evidence of policies because we think participants in the debate about judicial
decisions, including the parties arguing before a particular court, should have
equal access to the rhetorical modes of explanation and argument that are
available to the judge. Unlike public embodiments of policy, a litigant would
have no access to the judge's own lights. Under this view, public policies
would not necessarily be limited to the statements and actions of officials and
institutions, but could also include a reasonably well-defined list of nongovernmental sources. The point here, which is analogous to the point Rawls
makes in PoliticalLiberalism, is that the reasons judges use should reinforce and
support, or at least not undermine, public commitment to the process ofjudging.
This is not the place to resolve the details of these matters. Indeed, there
is surely room for debate, as a normative matter, about the types of reasons
judges should use.' Suffice it to say that Judge Linde has made an important
contribution to this debate, at least for one subset of reasons judges should use
to explain their decisions. But, to return to an earlier theme, the importance of
Judge Linde's comments lies not just in the particulars of his proposal, it lies
also in the methodological commitment to judging judges not just (even at all)
by the results of their decisions, but also (or only) by the reasons they give.
This is not to say that other normative disciplines cannot make useful critical
judgments about the results of judicial opinions, but law can do no more than
ask judges for the right kinds of reasons.

24. This does not mean that the legitimacy of judicial opinions in our actual legal system is
determined by these criteria.

That task is accomplished by the actual practices of our legal

discourse. The debate here is one of not7natlve jurisprudence.
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